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Introduction
Some tensions, especially around budget and tax issues, continued to prevail within the
non-typical Michel I federal coalition that was formed in 2014 (Rihoux et al. 2015). The
overall socioeconomic climate remained quite tense, amidst a disputed economic record
of the federal executive and some trade union mobilizations. Major corruption scandals
erupted or continued to unfold,while an unexpected coalition change reshuffled some cards
on the French-speaking side.The overall party-political atmosphere gradually becamemore
nervous as all parties began to gear up for the next electoral cycle with the local elections in
2018 followed by the regional, federal and European elections in 2019.
Election report
There were no elections in Belgium during 2017.
Cabinet report
As in the previous years, the largest party in the Michel I government, the Nationalist
New Flemish Alliance (N-VA), managed to keep its word and kept community conflicts
on hold – in spite of the fact that it still cherishes Flemish independence. The quite
unique and asymmetric Michel I cabinet (Rihoux et al. 2015), composed of three Flemish
parties and only one French-speaking party (the Liberal Reformist Movement – MR), was
therefore able to avoid tensions on the community front.All intra-cabinet conflicts occurred
between the three Flemish coalition parties, especially around socioeconomic issues, and the
francophone prime minister often had to act as appeaser between them.
The migrant crisis, and in particular alleged collaborations with the Sudanese
government, seriously hit Michel I. Several political opposition and civil society leaders
repeatedly called for the Secretary of State for Asylum and Migration Theo Francken
(N-VA) to resign, to no avail as the Michel I coalition partners stayed loyal to a quite hard
line on illegal migrants.
The crisis in the Walloon regional government slightly affected the federal government
in that Michel I lost one minister. As a consequence of the coalition change in the Walloon
cabinet,Willy Borsus becameMinister President of theWalloon Region and stood aside for
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his party colleague Denis Ducarme, former parliamentary group leader at the Chamber of
Representatives.
Parliament report
The fourth year of the legislature was characterized by a few changes in the Chamber
of Representatives. In Socialist Party Different (sp.a) (Flemish-speaking Socialists), Johan
Vande Lanotte was replaced by Annick Lambrecht on 10 January, and Ann Vanheste
was replaced by Youri Casier on 11 December. In the PS (French-speaking Socialist
Party), Willy Demeyer (PS) was replaced by Jacques Chabot on 2 November. In the N-
VA (Flemish Nationalists), Zuhal Demir was replaced by Wim Van der Donckt on 9
March because of her appointment as Secretary of State of Struggle against Poverty, Equal
Opportunities, the Disabled, Science Policy, in charge of Large Cities. Finally, in the MR
(French-speaking Liberals), Denis Ducarme was replaced by Isabelle Galant on 28 July
following his appointment as Minister of Middle Classes, the Self-employed, Small and
Medium-sized Companies, Agriculture and Social Integration.
In 2017, the mean share of women in the federal parliament stayed at around 40 per cent
in the Flemish-speaking group and 30 per cent in the French-speaking one.
Political party report
Most parties held regular party congresses, but none announced a major ideological turn
– perhaps with the exception of the PS which initiated a turn towards a more left-wing
stance as it had to face growing competition by the Maoist Workers’ Party of Belgium-Left
Opening! (PTB-Go!) party.
On the Flemish-speaking side, only one party needed to (re-)elect a leader: the N-VA.
Bart De Wever, elected for the first time in 2004, was chosen for a fifth mandate on 18
November by an all-member vote,with a 98.5 per cent majority and without any competitor.
No leadership or institutional party change occurred on the French-speaking side.
Institutional change report
As a result of the ‘sixth state reform’ that was agreed upon in November 2013 (Rihoux
et al. 2014) and following its stepwise implementation from 2014 onwards (Rihoux et al.
2015, 2016, 2017), further competences with associated budgets and staff were transferred
from the federal to the regional/community level. The main competences that were in effect
transferred on 1 January touched upon some specific healthcare policies: tobaccowithdrawal
treatments and home delivery of some healthcare services. A final batch of competences is
due to be transferred on 1 January 2018.
Issues in national politics
On the socioeconomic front, with a federal government announcing socioeconomics as its
top agenda, even though 69,000 new jobs were created during the year (a figure slightly
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Table 1. Cabinet composition of Michel I in Belgium in 2017
Duration of cabinet Inception 11 October 2014 Dissolution Still in office at end of 2017
Period covered by table From 1 January 2017 Until 31 December 2017
Type of cabinet Minimum winning coalition (MWC)
A. Party/gender composition on
1 January 2017
Seats in cabineta Seats held by women Seats in parliament
N % N % of party N %
New Flemish
Alliance/Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie
(N-VA), Dutch speaking
5 27.8% 1 20.0% 31 20.7%
Reformist Movement/Mouvement
réformateur (MR), French
speaking
7 38.9% 2 28.6% 20 13.3%
Christian Democrat and
Flemish/Christen-Democratisch en
Vlaams (CD&V), Dutch speaking
3 16.7% 0 0.0% 18 12.0%
Open Flemish Liberals and
Democrats/Open Vlaamse
Liberalen Demokraten (Open
VLD), Dutch speaking
3 16.7% 1 33.3% 14 9.3%
Totals 18 100.0% 4 22.2% 83 55.3%
B. Composition of Michel I cabinet on 1 January 2017
See previous editions of the Political Data Yearbook for Belgium (Rihoux et al. 2017) or
http://politicaldatayearbook.com
C. Changes in composition of Michel I cabinet during 2017
Ministerial title Outgoing minister Outgoing date Incoming minister Comments
Secretary of State of
Struggle against
Poverty, Equal
Opportunities, the
Disabled, Science
Policy, in charge of
Large Cities,
adjunct to the
Minister of
Finances and to
the Minister of
Interior
Elke Sleurs (1968
female, N-VA)
20 February Zuhal Demir (1980
female, N-VA)
Assumed office on
24 February
Minister of Middle
Classes, the
Self-employed,
Small and
Medium-sized
Companies,
Agriculture and
Social Integration
Willy Borsus
(1962 male,
MR)
26 July Denis Ducarme
(1973 male,MR)
Assumed office on
28 July
D. Party/gender composition on 31 December 2017
Same as on 1 January
Note: aIncluding four ‘secretaries of state’ (deputy/junior ministers).
Source: Centre de recherche et d’information socio-politiques (CRISP) (2018).
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Table 2. Party and gender composition of the lower house of parliament (Chambre des Représentants/Kamer
van Volksvertegenwoordigers) in Belgium in 2017
Party 1 January 2017 31 December 2017
All Women All Women
N % N % N % N %
Socialist Party/Parti socialiste (PS) 23 15.3% 7 30.4% 23 15.3% 7 30.4%
Christian Democrat and Flemish (CD&V) 18 12.0% 8 44.4% 18 12.0% 8 44.4%
Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats (Open VLD) 14 9.3% 7 50.0% 14 9.3% 7 50.0%
Reformist Movement (MR) 20 13.3% 5 25.0% 20 13.3% 6 33,0%
Socialist Party Different/Socialistische Partij Anders
(sp.a)
13 8.7% 7 53.8% 13 8.7% 7 53.8%
Humanist Democratic Centre/Centre démocrate
humaniste (cdH)
9 6.0% 3 33.3% 9 6.0% 3 33.3%
Flemish Interest/Vlaams Belang (VB) 3 2.0% 1 33.3% 3 2.0% 1 33.3%
New Flemish Alliance (N-VA) 31 20.7% 14 45.2% 31 20.7% 13 42,0%
Independents 2 1.3% 1 50.0% 2 1.3% 1 50.0%
Ecology Party/Écologistes (Ecolo) 6 4.0% 1 16.6% 6 4.0% 1 16.6%
Green (Groen) 6 4.0% 3 50.0% 6 4.0% 3 50.0%
Democratic Federalist Independent/Démocrate
Fédéraliste Indépendant (DéFI)
2 1.3% 0 0.0% 2 1.3% 0 0.0%
People’s Party/Parti Populaire (PP) 1 0.7% 0 0.0% 1 0.7% 0 0.0%
Workers’ Party of Belgium-Left Opening!/Parti du
travail de Belgique-Gauche d’ouverture!
(PTB-Go!)
2 1.3% 0 0.0% 2 1.3% 0 0.0%
Totals 150 100.0% 57 38.0% 150 100.0% 57 38.0%
Source: Data on gender were provided upon request by the General Services Department of the Belgian
federal parliament.
Table 3. Political party changes in Belgium in 2017
A. Party institutional changes in 2017
No changes in 2017
B. Party leadership changes in 2017
N-VA president Bart De Wever (1970 male, N-VA), re-elected on 18 November by membership
vote (98.5%)
Sources: Various media.
above that of 2016), a significant proportion of them were part-time or flexible jobs. The
economic growth went up to a still quite meagre 1.7 per cent, a figure below that of most of
the other Western countries. Bankruptcy figures were higher than in 2016, and the plant
closure at America’s Caterpillar in Gosselies became effective involving, together with
redundancies at suppliers, about 5000 job losses.
In that mixed climate, a general collective-bargaining agreement was reached early in the
year,ensuring less tension between unions and employers.Nonetheless, the year wasmarked
by some large union-led strikes and demonstrations aimed at the federal government,which
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responded by denouncing them as purely political protests instrumentalized especially by
the socialists.
In September, State Secretary for Asylum and Immigration, Theo Francken (N-VA),
caused further controversy by inviting a Sudanese delegation of officials to Brussels in spite
of the likelihood that they were security agents sent to identify opponents and, whenever
possible, arrange for their repatriation. As, according to testimonies of returned refugees,
some of those were tortured upon their forced return, deportations had to be suspended
pending an investigation. Francken also began to receive stark criticism, especially from
French-speaking opposition parties, for a draft bill that would enable the police to perform
house visits to citizens hosting illegal migrants so as to bring the latter in closed detention
centres and eventually deport them if applicable.
The Publifin affair, the political–financial scandal that erupted at the end of 2016
(Rihoux et al. 2017: 34–35), involving corrupt public representatives within large public
intermunicipal structures in the Walloon area of Liège, was not the only one to undermine
further public confidence in the political system. In the Flemish region, too, a similar
scandal was unearthed at the beginning of the year: the Publipart affair. In June, another
corruption scandal wrought havoc. Implying, among others, Yvan Mayeur, PS Mayor of the
City of Brussels, it led to his resignation and the setting up of a parliamentary investigation
committee. In the so-called Kazakhgate scandal (Rihoux et al. 2017: 34), the parliamentary
investigation committee that had been set up in late 2016 seemed to be going nowhere.
In the area of security, in the wake of the 2016 terrorist attacks at the national airport
and in the Brussels subway (Rihoux et al. 2017), the high alert level (3 on a scale of 4) was
maintained throughout the year.
On the French-speaking side, a serious political crisis was triggered by the sudden
coalition moves of the leader of the Francophone Humanist Democratic Centre (cdH),
Benoît Lutgen. On 19 June, without warning his ministers in the Walloon regional
government, the Brussels regional government and the community government of the
FédérationWallonie-Bruxelles,he announced at a press conference that he had discontinued
the coalition with the PS (Socialists), his main coalition partner in these sub-state executives.
He did manage to create a new coalition in the Walloon executive with the Liberals
(MR) under the leadership of the MR minister-president Willy Borsus installed on 28
July after a constructive vote of confidence. However, in the Brussels regional executive
coalition, composed of PS, cdH, Democratic Federalist Independent (DéFI) (the former
FDF (Fédéralistes Démocrates Francophones)), as well as the Christian Democrat and
Flemish (CD&V), Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats (Open VLD) and sp.a, no
alternative coalition could be brought together. After some months of ambiguity, this
‘caretaking’ executive again became effective. Consequently, it was also impossible to form
a new executive coalition for the Fédération Wallonie-Bruxelles. These coalition change
attempts, that occurred amongst francophone parties only,did not really concern the Flemish
parties and in particular did not lead to changes in the federal and Flemish regional
coalitions. Only the N-VA applauded Lutgen’s initiatives, as it had been pushing to oust
the Socialists since 2010 at all levels.
Another, entirely unexpected potential crisis came from Catalonia, when its
independentist minister president fled the country and settled in Brussels. Flemish
Nationalists, and the N-VA as their main party and also by now the predominant party in
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the federal and Flemish government, found themselves in an ambiguous position. While
individual N-VA members were allowed to express full support for Catalan independence
and their ‘brothers in exile’, the official position of the party was much more careful. The N-
VA realized that full support for Catalan independence and their leaders in exile in Brussels
would reinforce their own image as a separatist party, while the entire compromise that
had enabled the formation of the Michel I government (and that presumably would enable
a coalition continuation in 2019) was that they would put ethnolinguistic issues into the
political fridge and concentrate instead on socioeconomic topics on which a (centre-)right
compromise could be found more easily.
The N-VA minister of internal affairs of the Flemish government, Liesbeth Homans,
nominated the francophone Valérie Geeurickx (independent, but former vice-president of
the ‘Flemish-unfriendly’ FDF until 2014) mayor of Linkebeek, after decades of linguistic
troubles in that small Flemish commune in the Brussels periphery. Successive Flemish
ministers of internal affairs had refused the candidates proposed by the overwhelming
francophone majority in the local council of the formally Flemish commune, granting since
1963 linguistic facilities to the large francophone majority. This eased tensions at least on
the surface, while Flemish nationalists took on to scrutinize carefully every single word of
the new mayor and her local executive – technically, the latter are forbidden to use French
during municipal council meetings.
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